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Abstract 
This article uses Sedgwick’s distinction between minoritizing and universalizing theories of 
sexuality to analyze variability in social psychologists’ studies of anti-homosexual prejudice, 
focusing on studies of attitudes. Anti-homosexual prejudice was initially defined in conversation 
with gay liberationists and presumed, among other things, that fear of homoerotic potential was 
present in all persons. Later social psychologists theorized anti-homosexual prejudice in strict 
minoritizing terms: as prejudice towards a distinct out-group. In the first section of this paper we 
discuss corresponding shifts in the conceptualization of anti-homosexual attitudes. Next, using a 
universalizing framework, we re-interpret experiments on behavioral aspects of anti-homosexual 
attitudes which were originally conceptualized using a minoritizing framework, and suggest 
avenues for future research. Finally, we examine how queer theory might enrich this area of 
social psychological inquiry by challenging assumptions about the politics of doing scientific 
work and the utility of identity-based sexual politics. 
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_____________________________________________________________________________
This special issue concerns tensions between queer theory and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender studies, and the present article explores particular this tension with regard to social 
psychological studies of anti-homosexual prejudice.1 The early 1970s paradigm-shift away from 
disease models towards stigmatization models of homosexuality in psychology produced many 
attempts to measure individual differences in anti-homosexual prejudice among heterosexual-
identified people (many of which were published in Journal of Homosexuality). This research 
drew conceptually on lesbian and gay liberationist thought and methodologically on the positivist 
tradition of attitude measurement in psychology. Since the 1970s, the study of anti-homosexual 
attitudes has become one of the most prolific areas of lesbian and gay research within 
psychology. However, studies of anti-bisexual and anti-transgender prejudice remain far rarer 
(although see Spalding & Peplau, 1997; Tee, 2003). Both of us research anti-homosexual 
attitudes (see Hegarty, 2002; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Massey, 2004) and this paper aims to open 
the question of how the writings that have become known as queer theory lead to a 
reinterpretation of this area of social psychological research.  
 
Anti-Homosexual Attitudes and Social Constructionism 
 
Although attitudes have long been dignified as a central concern of social psychology 
(Allport, 1935), interest in attitudes has waxed and waned over the decades (Eagly, 1992). An 
attitude is typically defined as an internally located value judgment; as "a tendency or state that 
is internal to the person" (Eagly, 1992, p. 694) that "is expressed by evaluating a particular entity 
with some degree of favor or disfavor" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 1). Psychologists commonly 
measure individuals’ attitudes by eliciting their level of agreement or disagreement with various 
 opinion statements, and psychologists increasingly measure implicit attitudes via participants' 
speed of reaction to attitude relevant stimuli (Greenwald et al., 2002).  
Social constructionist scholars have repeatedly critiqued the essentialist assumption that 
internal psychological constructs such as "attitudes" can be known by available scientific 
methods (see Potter & Wetherell, 1987 on explicit attitudes and Steele & Morawski 2002 on 
implicit attitudes). Within social constructionism, Kitzinger’s (1987, 1989) radical feminist 
social constructionist analysis of measures of anti-homosexual prejudice is most germaine to the 
current discussion. By attending to the content of the questionnaire items selected to measure 
anti-homosexual prejudice, Kitzinger showed how psychologists had conflated pro-lesbian/gay 
attitudes with liberal humanist ideologies. For example, opinions that minimized differences 
between lesbians and straight women were defined as pro-lesbian attitudes. Kitzinger noted that 
this framework neglected political differences among lesbians and might even paradoxically cast 
radical lesbians as homophobic by virtue of their disagreement with liberal humanist 
assumptions. 
Like Kitzinger’s analyses, this paper unpacks the implicit sexual politics of anti-
homosexual attitudes research. However, unlike Kitzinger (1987) we do not consider this 
research to be a misplaced rhetorical exercise devoid of epistemic value. Moreover, while 
Kitzinger forwarded a radical feminist alternative to liberal humanism, our suggestions are 
developed from the problems raised by queer theory. For Kitzinger, sexual politics remains a 
question of inter-group conflict between differentially powerful, clearly defined groups. For 
example, she writes: 
 
Central to radical feminism is the belief that the patriarchy (not capitalism or sex roles or 
socialization or individual sexist men) is the root of all forms of oppression; that all men 
benefit from and maintain it and are, therefore, our political enemies (Kitzinger, 1987, p. 
64). 
 
In contrast, we seek to trouble the assumption that sexual politics operates exclusively, or even 
predominantly, through intergroup power contests. Rather we start with the observation that 
social psychologists have studied attitudes to just about everything: individuals, social groups, 
the self, objects, activities, policies, and ideologies. To what, then, are the anti-homosexual 
attitudes which social psychologists have measured opposed?  Is the homosexuality in question a 
minority group, a form of sexual practice, an identity performance, or a political movement?  
One of the central points of this paper is that in spite of over thirty years of published research on 
this topic, we do not yet have the data to answer this seemingly basic question.  
Our analysis is framed by Sedgwick’s (1990) claim that modern epistemologies are 
founded on problematic definitions of the homo/heterosexual binary. Specifically Sedgwick 
(1990, p. 1) juxtaposed the assumptions that sexual definition is either "an issue of active 
importance primarily for a small, distinct, relatively fixed homosexual minority" (the 
minoritizing view) or "an issue of continuing, determinative importance in the lives of people 
across the spectrum of sexualities" (the universalizing view). Sedgwick proposed this binary to 
render essentialist/constructivist debates about sexuality redundant, privileged neither 
assumption over the other, and called for their use to further anti-homophobic inquiry rather than 
to resolve epistemological tensions between them.  
In developing this analysis, we have leaded closer to the universalizing view. This is 
because current social psychological approaches to anti-homosexual attitudes are framed within 
 an implicit minoritizing approach that is heavily focused on sexual identity rather than sexual 
practice, and which understands anti-homosexual prejudice as an exemplar of minority group 
oppression (see Kitzinger & Coyle, 2002; Herek, 2000; Sanford, 2000). Below we trace how and 
when attitude measurement techniques began to assume the minoritizing position, and show how 
the results of experiments on behavioral effects of attitudes can be re-interpreted from within the 
universalizing view. Although we look at attitude measurement in close detail in this paper, our 
broader aim is to stimulate a conversation between social psychology and queer theory. In the 
conclusion of the paper we suggest some reasons for the absence of such a conversation, and 
offer some possible starting points for discussion.  
 
Measuring Anti-Homosexual Prejudice I: Gay Liberation and Universalizing Models 
 
 One of the greatest successes of the gay and lesbian liberationist movements was the 
removal of homosexuality from its minoritizing psychiatric definition as a mental illness in 1973 
(Bayer, 1981). Since World War II American mental health professionals had increasingly 
defined homosexuality in psychoanalytic terms, while simultaneously overwriting Freud’s 
(1923) universalizing – albeit heteronormative (Butler, 1990) – theory of primary bisexuality 
(Abelove, 1993; Lewes, 1989; Ryan & O Connor, 1998). This paradigm shift bore an uncanny 
resemblance to the earlier shift away from Eugenic models of race toward the study of anti-Black 
prejudice in post World War II American psychology (Richards, 1997; Samelson, 1978). The 
depathologizing of homosexuality occasioned new interest in the empirical study of anti-
homosexual prejudice. Liberationist writings relied on both universalizing and minoritizing 
approaches to sexuality. Calls for rights for lesbians and gay men were central, but 
heterosexuality itself was also understood as a limited erotic choice and one that was socially 
enforced (see Altman, 1972; Hocquenghem, 1972, 1978; Radicalesbians, 1969; Rich, 1980; 
Whitman, 1969-70, 1997; and, the later writings of Ellis, 1976).  
The term homophobia is most commonly attributed to clinical psychologist George 
Weinberg (Oxford English Dictionary), who described it as an irrational fear or "dread of being 
in close quarters with homosexuals" (Weinberg, 1972, p. 4). However, Weinberg’s work was 
deeply indebted to sexual liberationism. Weinberg acknowledged the influence of many gay and 
lesbian liberationists including Arthur Evans of the Gay Activist Alliance of New York, Randy 
Wicker, the founder of the Homosexual League of New York, Kay Tobin and Franklin Kameny, 
(Weinberg, 1972 and Ayyar, 2002). Chapters of Weinberg’s book Society and the Healthy 
Homosexual were first published in Gay, a magazine edited by gay liberation pioneers Jack 
Nichols and Lige Clarke. Weinberg also served as a spokesperson for some of the homophile 
organizations during their challenge to the APA’s inclusion of homosexuality as a diagnostic 
category in the DSM (Lewes, 1988). 
Weinberg’s concept aimed to shift attention away from questions of homosexuals’ mental 
(ill)health towards questioning the mental health of homophobes. Weinberg (1972) argued that 
he "would never consider a patient healthy unless he had overcome his prejudice of 
homosexuality" (p. 1). In a universalizing move, he suggested that homophobia not only limited 
self-identified heterosexuals’ social relationships, it also inhibited their erotic potentiality – a 
point also made, but somewhat ambivalently, by psychologist and sexual liberationist Albert 
Ellis (1976).2  Articulating a "new sexual culture", Weinberg (1972) wrote, "Gay liberation 
implies freedom from having to align oneself in sexual preference with dictates from anywhere" 
(p. 127). Positioning the sexual outsider as exemplary, he later stated that, "all love is 
 conspiratorial and deviant and magical" (Ayyar, 2002). Other theorists, such as psychoanalyst 
Wainwright Churchill (1967) offered similar conceptualizations of anti-homosexual prejudice, 
locating its origins in erotophobic society. 
Many of the social psychologists who developed technologies for measuring anti-
homosexual attitudes favorably cited Churchill’s and Weinberg’s theories (e.g., McDonald & 
Moore, 1978; Larsen, Reed & Hoffman, 1980; Hudson & Ricketts, 1980). Even Smith’s (1971) 
Homophobia Scale, which was published prior to Society and the Healthy Homosexual and 
before the depathologizing of homosexuality, was informed by Weinberg’s writings (see 
Weinberg, 1972, p. 133; personal communication, June 25, 2003). Attempts to measure anti-
homosexual prejudice explicitly located the source of discomfort around homosexuality in 
societal prejudice rather than in homosexuals themselves. Thus, Smith (1971) called for the 
study of the "social milieu" (p. 1089) in which the homosexual person lives and MacDonald, 
Huggins Young, and Swanson (1973, p. 10) argued for movement from an "organism 
deficiency" to a "social deficiency" explanation for discrimination. Such arguments occasionally 
drew on minoritizing frameworks by making analogies between anti-homosexual prejudice and 
anti-Black racism. For example, MacDonald and Games (1974) suggested that approaches to 
psychological inquiry that were "almost exclusively restricted to blacks [sic] and the poor… 
should be extended to include other discriminated against groups" (p. 10). In other words, anti-
racist work provided an available model for understanding homophobia as a form of intergroup 
prejudice. 
The "society" which was understood to be the origin of homophobia was to be assessed 
via correlations between measures of anti-homosexual prejudice and the endorsement of relevant 
ideologies. Weinberg (1972) had theorized that homophobia was derived from such motives as 
religion, fear of being homosexual, repressed envy, a threat to values, and fear of death. Attitude 
researchers correspondingly gathered data showing correlational relationships that were germane 
to these claims. Smith (1971) found evidence of correlations between anti-gay prejudice and the 
need for conventionality, conformity, and the need to maintain traditional sex and gender roles. 
Dunbar, Brown and Amoroso (1973) found that anti-homosexual participants were significantly 
more conservative and negative regarding sexual practices in general, expressed significantly 
more sex guilt, and were significantly more rigid in terms of their view of "appropriate" sex-
roles. Yet, even as anti-homosexual prejudice was becoming understood as partially comprised 
of sex-role rigidity, feminists were transforming social psychologists’ definitions of sex roles. 
Until the 1970s psychologists had assumed masculinity and femininity to be logical opposites, 
and had often conflating masculinity-femininity with psychological differences between straight 
and gay men (Constantinople, 1973; Hegarty, 2003; Lewin, 1982a, b). Feminist researchers re-
theorized masculinity and femininity as constraining roles, and posited psychologically healthy 
androgynous individuals who could flexibly adopt either role as the situation dictated (e.g., Bem, 
1974; Bem & Lenney, 1978). Research on androgyny and on anti-homosexual attitudes similarly 
presumed that individuals who could transgress overly rigid sexual and gender roles were 
psychologically healthy. Several researchers worked to correlate new measures of gender roles 
and new measures of anti-homosexual prejudice (e.g., Minnigerode, 1976; Storms, 1978). 
Societal homophobia, in line with liberationists’ universalizing notions and 
psychodynamic theory, was understood to shape individuals’ emotions. Both Weinberg’s and 
Churchill’s works were frequently cited as the theoretical justifications for these hypotheses 
(e.g., Smith, 1971, p. 1091; Dunbar, Brown & Amoroso, 1973, pp. 271-272; Hudson & Ricketts, 
1980, p. 357). Attitude researchers predicted affective responses within the parlance of ego 
 defense. Anti-homosexual prejudice was thought to derive from personal anxiety (Millham, San 
Miguel, & Kellogg, 1976), sex guilt (Dunbar, Brown, & Amoroso, 1973), and fear and denial of 
personal homosexual tendencies (Mosher & O’Grady, 1979).  
Sociological theories that cast sexual orientations as learned or socially constructed 
provided a further theoretical basis for universalizing approaches to the measurement of anti-
homosexual prejudice. Citing constructionist theories which located male sex socialization in the 
context of sex guilt (i.e., Gagnon & Simon 1973; Simon & Gagnon, 1969), Mosher and 
O’Grady’s (1979) measure of homosexual threat included heterosexuals’ relationship to their 
own erotic responses in their empirical measure of anti-homosexual prejudice. Fear and denial 
of homoerotic tendencies became a component of their Homosexual Threat Inventory, originally 
conceptualized as agreement or disagreement with items referring to same-sex eroticism and 
desire, such as "to love another man is to know the heights of the human soul" and "I could never 
bring myself to suck another man’s cock."   
In short, there was heterogeneity of measures of anti-homosexual prejudice in the 1970s 
variously indebted to psychoanalysis, liberationist thinking, social constructionism, second wave 
feminism and the civil rights movement. The new scales typically included items that measured 
attitudes towards lesbians or gay men as a distinct minority group. For example, Smith’s (1971) 
H-Scale included the item "Homosexuals should be locked up to protect society" and the item "A 
homosexual could be a good president of the United States" (p. 1094). Millham, San Miguel, and 
Kellogg’s Homosexuality Attitude Scale included the item "Most male homosexuals dislike 
women" (p. 5), and Mosher and O’Grady’s Homosexual Threat Inventory included the item 
"Homosexuals should stay in their own gay bars and not flaunt their deviance" (p. 864). 
However, universalizing ideas about universal bisexual potentiality were also commonly cited. 
For example, Smith’s scale included the item "If laws against homosexuality were eliminated, 
the proportion of homosexuals in the population would probably remain the same" (suggesting, 
when reversed, the need for social control of a universal homosexual potential). Millham, San 
Miguel and Kellogg’s scale included the item "Male homosexuality is a choice of lifestyles."  
Finally, Mosher and O’Grady’s scale included the item "I am frightened that I might have 
homosexual tendencies." Indeed, to the extent that it drew on such universalizing themes, the 
work of the 1970s represented measurement of biphobic attitudes as much as the measurement of 
homophobic attitudes.  
 
Measuring Anti-Homosexual Prejudice II: Social Reform and Minoritizing Models 
 
Towards the end of the 1970s, gay and lesbian politics became organized less around the 
goal of sexual liberation and more around the assimilationist goal of achieving civil rights (see 
D’Emilio, 1983; Week, 1985; Kitzinger, 1987). The utopian call for sexual revolution was 
supplanted by the more moderate (and arguably more achievable) goal of social reform. 
Reactionary figures such as Anita Bryant who cast gay men and lesbians as a threat to the 
American family played a lethally important part in defining the terms of this cultural conflict. 
Radical theories of sexuality, perceived by some as fulfilling stereotypes of the promiscuous, 
predatory and anti-family homosexual (and perhaps aggravating unreconciled sex-guilt within 
gay people themselves) became more difficult to articulate. The increasing engagement of 
mainstream institutions with lesbian and gay right agendas occasioned new sexuality hierarchies 
within lesbian and gay subcultures. For example, in 1980 the National Organization of Women 
(NOW) codified its support for lesbian rights while signaling its condemnation of pederasty, 
 sadomasochism, and pornography (National Organization of Women, 1980). As Rubin (1984) 
put it several seemingly liberal institutions such as NOW still attempted to draw an "imaginary 
line between good and bad sex." Such sexual politics were motivated as much by fear of the 
unknown as by concern with liberation or fairness, as such a line was imagined to: 
 
…stand between sexual order and chaos. It expresses the fear that if anything is permitted 
to cross this erotic DMZ, the barrier against scary sex will crumble and something 
unspeakable with skitter across (p. 14). 
  
Psychologists’ definitions of anti-homosexual prejudice also became increasingly focused 
on minoritizing concerns during the early 1980s (e.g., Herek, 1984, Kite & Deaux, 1986; Larsen, 
Reed, & Hoffman, 1980). Earlier scales were vulnerable to several criticisms; those who scored 
high on homophobia scales did not manifest the typical physiological reactions that accompany a 
clinical "phobia" (see Millham & Weinberger, 1977; Shields & Harriman, 1984). Also, the 
predicted link between anti-homosexual prejudice and gender roles failed to materialize (see 
Whitley, 2001). Finally, the earlier scales had also been implicitly androcentric; by asking 
questions about homosexuals they most probably elicited attitudes towards male homosexuality 
only (see Black & Stevenson, 1984). Thus the development of new scales for attitude 
measurement was easily positioned as a scientific advance rather than as a shift in the implicit 
politics that informed the concept of anti-homosexual prejudice. 
However, consider Herek’s (1984) Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG) 
scale, which is now a standard in the field. Herek defined heterosexism in explicitly minoritizing 
terms as "a term analogous to sexism and racism, describing an ideological system that denies, 
denigrates, and stigmatizes any non-heterosexual form of behavior, identity relationship, or 
community" (Herek, 1990). Several of the earlier scales that drew on universalizing views were 
multi-factorial, and measured several distinct components of anti-homosexual prejudice allowing 
liberal notions of tolerance and civil rights to coexist with ego-defensive aspects of anti-
homosexual prejudice. Herek (1984) questioned the necessity of multifactorial scales, and 
ultimately concluded that only a single factor was required to conceptualize heterosexism.  
Herek (1984) reported four studies which drew on both earlier attitude measures (Levitt 
& Klassen, 1974; MacDonald et al., 1973; Millham et al., 1976; Smith, 1971) and some original 
items. Notably, Herek excluded items from Mosher and O’Grady (1979) arguing that the "locker 
room" language of these behavioral items would offend participants instead of tapping into 
feelings of personal threat. This empirically unsupported supposition was ironically made during 
the early days of the HIV/AIDS crisis when anti-homosexual prejudice operated most forcefully 
through heterosexuals’ feelings of personal threat. The omission of Mosher and O’Grady’s items 
demonstrates how social psychologists technologies are shaped as much by implicit sexual 
politics as much as the empirical results that they gather.  
Exploratory factor analysis revealed a variety of factors, including: 
condemnation/repression, personal revulsion/threat and the desire to avoid contact, desire to 
keep away from children, beliefs about homosexuals, denial of similarities between 
heterosexuals and homosexuals, and comparing of heterosexual and homosexual relationships. 
In each study, however, the condemnation/tolerance factor explained a much larger portion of 
the variance among items than the other factors, allowing Herek to argue that a unidimensional 
model was most "appropriate" and that all other factors were of trivial importance. Herek’s 
resulting Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG) scale examines attitudes along a 
 single continuum from tolerance to condemnation via items which assess emotional reactions to 
lesbians and gay men and support for civil rights issues. Although Herek’s definition refers to 
stigmatization of non-heterosexual behavior, questions concerning respondents own construction 
of their same-sex desires or behaviors are absent from the ATLG.  
 As Sedgwick notes, however, minoritizing and universalizing views of sexuality are 
never completely stable or separate in modern epistemologies. While developing the ATLG, 
Herek (1987) also began to assess the functions of anti-homosexual attitudes (and later, in 
articles related to AIDS, Herek, 2000). The study of attitude functions is indebted to 
psychoanalytic theorizing (see Katz, 1960), and had been critiqued on the grounds that attitude 
functions could not be empirically detected or measured. Herek’s (1987) work argued that 
heterosexism served a variety of functions for different individuals including the expression of 
core values, reflecting cognitive beliefs, and defending against threats to the ego. In this last 
regard, Herek has explicitly argued that for a minority of heterosexual-identified persons, 
heterosexism is a result of displaced fear of their own homoerotic potential. Thus, Herek has 
operationalized universalizing ideas in his attitudes work, even though they have been excluded 
from his operational definition of anti-homosexual prejudice.  
 
Experimenting with Identity: Linking Attitudes to Behaviors 
 
 Implicit in the study of attitudes is the promise that these internal constructs will in some 
way affect social behavior. However, the attitude-behavior link has often been shown to be 
absent (LaPiere, 1934) and during the 1970s social psychological research increasingly examined 
factors that might affect the strength of this link (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980). Thus, demonstrations 
of behavioral effects of anti-homosexual attitudes also became a topic of research, and such 
demonstrations were typically made with experimental studies. As in most other areas of social 
psychology, the experimental participants were typically college undergraduates, (Sears, 1986). 
These participants made a judgment about, or interacted with, a target individual, whose 
perceived sexual orientation was experimentally manipulated. Such experimental studies have 
varied in their realism. Some have involved the presentation of written information about 
individuals identified as gay, lesbian, or straight (see Laner & Laner, 1979, 1980; Sigelman, 
Howell, Cornell, Cutright, & Dewey, 1990; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; Storms, Stivers, 
Lambers, & Hill, 1981; Weissbach & Zagon, 1975). In others, participants encountered flesh-
and-blood individuals who enacted particular sexual orientations (see Clark & Maass, 1988; 
Kite, 1992; Kite & Deaux, 1986, Study 2; Kruwelitz & Nash, 1980; San Miguel & Milham, 
1976). In both cases, differences between the actions of participants with high and low levels of 
heterosexism to lesbian/gay and straight targets have been used to ground inferences about the 
behavioral consequences of anti-homosexual attitudes. For example, Kite and Deaux (1986) 
report that intolerant heterosexual males and tolerant heterosexual males differed in their liking 
of gay male targets, the information that they elicited from him, the information they presented 
about themselves and their memories of the interaction.  
While these experiments have presumed to assess behavioral reactions to lesbians and 
gay men as a distinct minority group, they owe an unacknowledged debt to universalizing 
theories of homo/heterosexual definition. The experiments require that target individuals 
manipulate the presentation of their sexual identities, and typically, the same individuals have 
played the roles of both lesbian (or gay) target and of straight target in these experiments. Thus, 
targets have "done" straightness by direct disclosure (Clark & Maass, 1988, p. 351), mention of 
 an intention to marry (Kruwelitz & Nash, 1980, p. 69), or, most frequently, by saying nothing 
about sexuality at all and allowing assumptions of compulsory heterosexuality (Rich, 1980) to go 
untroubled (see Gurwitz & Markus, 1978, p. 50; Cuenot & Fugita, 1982, p. 102; Kite, 1992 p. 
1226; Kite & Deaux, 1986, p. 148; San Miguel & Milham, 1976, p. 18). Lesbian and gay 
identities have been "done" in the laboratory through direct verbal (Clark & Maass, 1988, p. 351) 
or written (Kruwelitz & Nash, 1980, p. 69) disclosure, expressions of interest in ongoing 
experiments about homosexuality (San Miguel & Millham, 1976, p. 18), suggestions of 
homosexuality as a topic for discussion (Kite, 1992, p. 1226; Kite & Deaux, 1986, p. 148), 
buttons that says "gay and proud" (Cuenot & Fugita, 1982, p. 102), and mention of involvement 
in gay student organizations. (Gurwitz & Marcus, 1978, p. 50) 
  As Sedgwick (1990, p. 4) notes the wearing of a gay-positive t-shirt not only reports an 
identity, it also constitutes it. Participants’ differential reactions to the targets in these 
experiments have been theorized as discriminatory reactions to lesbian/gay and straight 
individuals. However, the actions through which gay/lesbian identities are enacted are scripted to 
be highly volitional, and people who do not engage in such actions are not necessarily always 
straight. These experiments may just as readily be understood as assessing differential responses 
to out and passing lesbian/gay individuals, as to straight and (out) lesbian/gay individuals. In 
other words, the experiments may be assessing differential reactions to ways of enacting 
minority sexual identities, rather than differential reactions to members of separate discrete 
social groups.  
Following Sedgwick and Butler (1990, 1991; Osborne & Segal, 1994) we might 
understand these targets identity enactments as performative of identity. If the targets’ methods 
of performing identity are understood as constituting identity in different ways rather than simply 
reporting the same underlying identity, then it is less clear that these experiments are all 
examining the same social psychological processes. Explicit declaration of one’s homosexuality, 
mention of involvement in a gay student group, and the wearing of a gay-positive button are not 
equivalent speech acts, and each accomplishes something more than the revelation of a presumed 
underlying identity (as readers who have negotiated disclosure dynamics will probably 
recognize). Butler argues against presumed unity among those represented by political signifiers 
(i.e., women, lesbians and gay men) and argues for a mode of politics that intervenes in the 
moments when such identities are thrown into question. This leads us to think differently about 
the empirical claims that are made from experimental results, and the need to theorize and 
examine social psychological experimental practice. On the first point, future experiments that 
acknowledged the performativity of identity could begin to examine if different performances of 
sexual identities moderates the relationship between research participants’ anti-homosexual 
attitudes and their anti-homosexual behavior. On the second, the doing of experiments represents 
a particular kind of constructivist work; ironically, the positivist space of the psychological 
laboratory is perhaps the location where the postmodern fantasy that identities can be put on and 
taken off as easily as clothing has some legitimacy. An ethnographic study of psychological 
laboratories could greatly inform the politics of universalizing theories by illuminating a concrete 
set of practices where social identities are designed to be highly mutable (Hegarty, 2001).  
 
Queer Theory and Attitudes Research: Working the Tensions 
 
 Compared to the early 1970s heterogeneous alliances between liberationist, 
psychoanalytic, and social constructionist thought and positivist technologies of attitude 
 measurement, the intellectual work now known as queer theory (e.g., Abelove, Barale, & 
Halperin, 1993; Butler, 1990; DeLauretis, 1991; Fuss, 1991; Sedgwick, 1990; Warner, 1993) 
has, for better or worse, been considerably less engaged with academic psychology. Contrast, for 
example, the plethora of empirical articles on anti-homosexual prejudice published in the early 
volumes of Journal of Homosexuality with the almost complete lack of quantitative social 
science research in the more recent GLQ: A Journal of Gay and Lesbian Studies. Clearly, queer 
theory emerged in a way that was less bound up with the quantitative social sciences than did its 
liberationist forerunner. Below we examine why this might be so, and theorize where productive 
intersections might emerge in future work.    
Of course, queer theory differs radically from liberationist thought in its conception of the 
individual subject. Liberationist work proposed that societal repression of individualized sexual 
natures was the primary mode of sexual politics. Foucault’s History of Sexuality: Volume 1 
(1978), arguably the most influential book within queer theory, theorized power as operating 
through the production of sexuality and sexual categories as much as by their repression. 
Foucault called for heightened critique of ostensibly liberating breaks with the repressive past 
and seemingly rational advancements in the human sciences. As in much of Foucault’s writing, 
his theory of sexuality describes the sciences of the human subject as originating in political 
attempts to control and order human bodies (see also Foucault, 1977). As such Foucault’s work 
provides grounds for extreme skepticism about any project focused on individual differences or 
the measurement of mental states such as attitudes research.  
Second, when queer theorists did turn to a theory of the individual subject, they tended to 
alight on psychoanalysis. Warner (1993, p. xi), for one, described psychoanalysis as "the most 
rigorous and sophisticated language about sexuality."  As Kitzinger (1998) notes, imperatives to 
think the psychological subject as a psychoanalytic subject within sexuality and gender studies 
substantially limit engagement with academic psychology. Relationships between quantitative 
psychologists and psychoanalysts have never been easy in American psychology (Hornstein, 
1992), and by the late 1980s, cognitive psychology, and not psychoanalysis, was the dominant 
truth regime in psychology (Friman, Allen, Kirwin, & Larzelere, 1992). By comparison with 
queer engagements with psychoanalytic assumptions, critiques of the heteronormativity of 
cognitive theories of the subject were slow to emerge (although see Curtain, 1997 and 
Helmreich, 1998 for notable exceptions). Thus queer theory became interested mostly in a theory 
of the subject which was peripheral to the interests of most social psychologists by the early 
1990s. 
Finally, lesbian and gay psychology has been a more cautious disciplinary project than 
queer theory. North American lesbian and gay psychologists positioned their work as empirical 
disciplinary work, often leading to a dismissal of the counter-disciplinary projects ongoing in 
lesbian, gay and queer studies. Most obviously, psychologist John Gonsierek (1993, viii-ix) in 
the foreword to a historical volume described lesbian and gay studies as an "inward looking", 
"self-absorbed" domain where "dogma is substituted for critical thinking." Lesbian and gay 
studies, for Gonsierek was both "intellectually rigid and irrelevant both to the lives of gay and 
lesbian citizens and to honest intellectual inquiry." This caution has also limited the degree to 
which lesbian and gay psychologists discuss sex. Lesbian and gay psychologists, however, have 
typically been less willing to challenge the stigmatization of gay and lesbian sex than have their 
colleagues in the humanities. Sex research has always been stigmatized, and an explicit 
affirmative study of gay and lesbian sexualities has been read as constituting an infraction 
against implicit norms for scientific objectivity (Hegarty, in press; Irvine, 1990). While many 
 queer theorists focused their approach on sex, rather than sexual identity (Sedgwick, 1990; 
Warner, 1993), lesbian and gay psychology has tended to privilege identity over behavior as the 
object of inquiry (Kitzinger & Coyle, 2002, p. 18).  
In spite of these differences, we agree with the editors of this special issue that useful 
theory can be made from tensions between lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender studies and 
queer theory. Unlike Kitzinger (1987) we are not content to dismiss social psychology as purely 
rhetorical practice. Rather, we believe there are clear grounds for re-thinking the empirical 
record on anti-homosexual prejudice in light of the conceptual developments made by queer 
theorists.  
Consider first the politics of knowledge production. Within social psychology, 
researchers have historically understood themselves to be accumulating empirical facts and 
developing an ever-growing body of knowledge about social behavior (Farr, 1996). However, 
even as gay liberationist ideas were being translated into attitude scales, Gergen (1973) 
suggested that both the findings of social psychological studies and the methods used to achieve 
those findings were bound by history. As Kitzinger and Coyle (2002) note, contemporary lesbian 
and gay psychologists have tended to either adopt traditional quantitative methods (Herek, 1998) 
or to embrace qualitative methods which eschew the reality of internal psychological processes 
(Gough, 2002; Speers & Potter, 2000). Queer theory might suggest how social psychologists 
could have their attitude technologies and deconstruct them too. In the context of HIV/AIDS 
from which queer theory largely emerged, it became necessary to critically read the biomedical 
discourse through which "facts" about AIDS were being produced and to develop strategies for 
living with the virus. As Paula Treichler noted, this involves a kind of double consciousness: 
 
Of course, where AIDS is concerned, science can usefully perform its interpretive part: 
we can learn to live – indeed, must learn to live – as though there are such things as 
viruses. The virus – a constructed scientific object – is also a historical subject, a “human 
immunodeficiency virus,” a real source of illness and death that can be passed from one 
person to another under certain conditions that we can apparently – individually and 
collectively – influence. The trick is to learn to live with this disjunction, but the lesson is 
imperative. (Treichler, 1991, p. 69). 
 
We would like to encourage the learning of such a trick in regard to the psychological category 
of anti-homosexual prejudice. We need to theorize by acknowledging the interpretive work that 
attitude scales can perform with regard to social prejudices, while also recognizing their 
historicity, contingency, and limitations. In concert with Sedgwick’s (1990) approach this may 
involve nurturing anti-homophobic inquiry within mutually incompatible epistemologies and a 
suspension of the Platonic desire to immediately resolve their inconsistencies.  
 One benefit of learning the trick to which Treichler (1991) refers would be the ability to 
see earlier modes of knowledge production as different from, but not necessarily inferior to, 
current paradigms. We might revisit the liberationist work of the 1970s as grounds for re-
theorizing the complexity of heterosexism. Ironically, even work within the minoritizing 
perspective consistently shows relationships between anti-homosexual prejudice and 
authoritarianism, traditional gender role beliefs, and affective reactions (Whitley, 1999; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Herek’s shift away from homophobia to terms such as sexual 
prejudice and heterosexism may have obscured some persistent ways that anti-homosexual 
prejudice is bound up with affect and ego-defense. Consideration of the historicity of the 
 psychological knowledge, coupled with a willingness to continue to work with that knowledge, 
might create new lines of inquiry within social psychology (see Massey, 2004).  
 The second productive "tension" concerns the position of identity categories in lesbian 
and gay psychology.  Anti-heterosexual attitudes have been increasingly researched from within 
a minoritizing frame, and this frame limits our theorizing of the ways that different kinds of 
identity performance elicit different kinds of prejudicial responses. Queer theorists argued that 
the available political categories for thinking about sexual politics were insufficient, and 
prioritized a kind of social reflection in the doing of queerness (Warner, 1993). There were many 
reasons for this skepticism in addition to Foucault’s skepticism about the ontology of the human 
subject. Jagose (1993) describes queer as originating within gay and lesbian communities’ 
responses to the AIDS epidemic. Initially considered a gay disease, AIDS affected many who did 
not identify with this group, forcing researchers and activists to admit the obvious inconsistency 
between homosexual identity and homosexual behavior. Queer identity was then based on 
affinity rather than some essential quality, and attempts to analogize gay communities and gay 
and lesbian communities along ethnic lines (Epstein, 1985) were attacked as queer theory 
emerged (Cohen, 1991).  
A queer approach would lead us to question the assumption that homosexual behavior 
and identity can be collapsed, or that one can serve as a valid ontology for the other. Butler 
(1993, pp. 1-23) has been careful to distinguish her account of performativity from the notion 
that identities can be constructed whole cloth, volitionally, as social psychologists report doing 
with their targets in their experiments. Her work then provides grounds for a critique, not only of 
lesbian and gay psychology, but of experimental psychologists’ more general nature/nurture 
debates which nominate learned or social behaviors as those which can be changed in laboratory 
settings, and natural or hardwired behavior as those which can not. Butler’s work would lead us 
to question the particulars through which social psychological variables are operationalized, 
rather than to assume that all operationalizations are equivalent (see also Cherry, 1995). What 
does the wearing of a button accomplish?  Does it have the same performative effect as signaling 
a desire to take part in a psychology experiment pertaining to homosexuality?  
Experiments which use multiple performances of gay/lesbian or straight identities suggest 
that such an approach might produce useful theory. For example, Sigelman, Howell, Cornell, 
Cutright, and Dewey’s (1990) participants read about a straight male target who acquired a gay 
male roommate either by choice or by accident, and assigned the former target more homosexual 
tendencies, "gay-stereotyped" traits, lower mental health, and rated him to be less likeable. 
Experiments have increasingly shown that gay male targets are derogated only when they enact 
their identities in particular ways. Moreno and Bodenhausen’s (2001) participants only 
discriminated against an openly gay target (making a pro-gay speech) when his presentation was 
riddled with errors. Hegarty, Pratto, and Lemieux (in press) have since used vignette studies to 
show that gay male targets who express discomfort about straight environments are derogated in 
ways that equivalent targets who stifle their discomfort are not. Such experiments suggest that 
not all performances of sexual identities are equivalent, leading us to question whether or not 
experimental studies of gay identity represent a unified literature at all.  
 Finally, queer theory points to the need for a re-thinking of the relationship between 
racism and anti-homosexual prejudice in social psychology. Several of the key texts of queer 
theory linked their anti-essentialist claims to anti-racist scholarship (Duggan, 1990; Warner, 
1993). As we’ve noted above, anti-homosexual inquiry has often looked to anti-racist work for 
ways of understanding both minority identities and majority prejudices. However, for queer 
 theorists such analogies run the risk of raising one dimension of difference at the risk of 
obscuring others (Lorde, 1984), overlooking the effects of heteronormativity on the lives of 
ethnic minority heterosexuals (Cohen, 1997), and ignoring the co-construction of racial and 
sexual categories (Sommerville, 2000). Such analogies confuse two very different forms of 
prejudice which social psychologists also argue are organized by different ideologies and 
motivations (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Whitley, 1999). At worst, the metaphor can imply 
that the two forms of prejudice are mutually exclusive, obscuring the ways that some lives are 
shaped by both. Such political commitments require that social psychologists do not simply 
position heterosexism as analogous to racism, but begin to use traditional technologies such as 
surveys and experiments to understand their intersections (see Battle et al., 2002; Clausell & 
Hegarty, 2003). 
 
Conclusions  
 
 Many of the now canonical queer theory writings cautiously position themselves as 
supplementary to, rather than in opposition to, scientific epistemologies (Treichler, 1991) and 
civil rights politics based on identity categories (Warner, 1993; Butler, 1990; de Lauretis, 1991). 
Similarly, our goal here is not to rehash social constructionist critiques of empirical social 
psychology that describes such work as meaningless, or simply as the operations of power 
(Gergen, 1973; Kitzinger, 1987). Rather it seems to us that empirical research on heterosexism 
constitutes a relatively new mode of creating knowledge, and that those of us who do that work 
would be well to attend to the sexual politics involved in carrying it out (Hegarty, 2001). 
Empiricist narratives lead us away from this kind of theorizing, diminish the contributions of our 
liberationist forerunners, and must be supplemented by the kind of reflection that queer theory 
engenders. Queer theory does not require the abolition of scientific epistemology. Rather, as 
Triechler (1991) notes, the trick is to have science play its interpretive part, while also remaining 
conscious of the distinction between the part and the whole of anti-prejudicial inquiry and action.  
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 Footnotes 
1The terms used to describe antipathy towards homosexuality have varied within the 
social psychological literature over the time period that we describe here. Heterosexism and 
homophobia have been the most commonly used term but homosexism, homonegativism, and 
others have also been used. We use this somewhat cumbersome term anti-homosexual prejudice 
in this paper to gain some distance from the more familiar terms, as one of our goals is to bring 
to light the implicit theoretical commitments that often pass unnoticed in the use of such terms.  
2Although Ellis was a sexual liberationist, activist, and a proponent of decriminalizing 
homosexuality, his views on the mental health of homosexuals changed over his long career. In 
earlier writings, while he argued from a universalizing perspective for a radical sexual 
humanism, Ellis also claimed that exclusive homosexuality was, "wrong - meaning inefficient, 
self-defeating, and emotionally disturbed" (1965, p. 78). Later, in the context of the gay 
liberation movement, he modified his theory. No longer singling out exclusive homosexuality as 
a problem, Ellis (1976) suggested instead that all fixed modes of (compulsive) sexual behavior, 
both homosexual and heterosexual, were potentially neurotic, and that these "standards of 
emotional disturbance" (p. 298) must be applied equally to both gay and straight people. In other 
words, Ellis’ commitment to universalizing theory eventually took precedent over any 
commitment that he might have voiced towards anti-homosexual theory 
